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On a bilateralist reading, sequents are interpreted as statements to the
effect that, given the assertion of the antecedent it is incoherent to deny the
succedent. This interpretation goes against its own ecumenical ambitions,
endowing Cut with a meaning very close to that of tertium non datur and
thus rendering it intuitionistically unpalatable. This paper explores a top-
down route for arguing that, even intuitionistically, a prohibition to deny is
as strong as a license to assert.
1 Preamble
Frege’s (1919) doctrine that to deny a statement is to assert its negation led
to denial being pushed to the periphery of logical theorising. In the past
decades, however, denial made a spectacular comeback (cf. Humberstone,
2000). Thus, for instance, Price (1983) initiates a programme aimed to pro-
vide an account of meaning based on both ‘assertion and denial conditions’
which validates classical logic. Smiley (1996) adds to this generic programme
of recovering denial (he calls it ‘rejection’) for the purposes of logical theo-
rising, arguing, e.g., that ‘the equivalence between rejecting [p] and asserting
[∼ p] does not make rejection redundant’ (4).
For all that, denial returned in a changed world, in which challenges to the
hegemony of classical logic abound and its usefulness must be assessed also
in relation to non-classical logics. Recently, Restall (2005) appealed to denial
for a defence of classical logic, albeit from a pluralist perspective that forces
us to account for denial in relation to non-classical logics, and in particular
with intuitionist logic, as well.1
However, it is not immediately clear that denial can successfully be used
in this way. This paper presents the problem and proposes a solution to it.
For good measure, the solution itself relies on reconsidering a fundamental
1For other uses of denial from a non-classical perspective, see, e.g., Priest (2005), chapter 6.
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idea about how sequent calculi determine consequence relations, namely that
the sequents themselves are a kind of entailments.
2 The problem
Restall (2005) proposes a bilateralist reading of sequents which places denial
(or its mental counterpart, rejection) on a par with assertion (or its mental
counterpart, acceptance). At its core lies the concept of a state, i.e., a pair
X : Y of finite collections of statements in which all the members of X
are asserted and all the members of Y are denied. Some states are coherent :
there is no clash in jointly asserting all the members of X and jointly denying
all the members of Y . Others are incoherent : the assertion of X clashes with
the denial of Y . Hereafter, the colon will serve as a sign for both coherent
and incoherent states, disambiguation is achieved by (con)text.
Sequents represent incoherent states: having asserted the antecedent, it is
incoherent to deny the succedent. On this reading, the rule of Identity (Id)
Id
A : A




states that if the assertion of X and the denial of Y are jointly incoherent,
then the incoherence is preserved if A is added to Y . According to the rules
for introducing conjunction in the antecedent,
Ai, X : Y &Li (i ∈ {1, 2})A1 &A2, X : Y
if the denial of Y is ruled out by the assertion of Ai, X, then its denial is also
ruled out by the assertion of A1 &A2, X. The introduction in succedent
X : Y,A1 X : Y,A2
&R
X : Y,A1 &A2
states that if the denial of Y,A1 is ruled out by the assertion of X and the
denial of Y,A2 is also ruled out by the assertion of X, then the denial of
Y,A1 &A2 is ruled out by the same assertion.
The main beneficiary of this re-interpretation of the sequent calculus is
the classical logician. On a bilateral reading, succedents consisting of more
than one formula occurrence are no longer construed as disjunctions – a
very contentious and often criticised feature of the classical sequent calculus
(Dummett, 1991; Steinberger, 2010). Instead, they read as conjunctions
under a sui generis force operator: ‘do not deny’.
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However, the account has a more ecumenical scope and it is meant to be
acceptable, e.g., to the intuitionist. This is problematic because a bilaterally
interpreted Cut
X : Y,A A,X : Y
Cut
X : Y
can be seen as an extensibility condition on coherent states:
Extensibility If X : Y is coherent, then so is one of A,X : Y and X : Y,A.2
This principle is reminiscent of the law of the excluded middle, coming sus-
piciously close to saying that every statement is either deniable or assertible
(in a context).
Restall goes to some pains to ensure that, despite appearances to the
contrary, ‘[extensibility] does not rule out truth-value gaps and it does not
implicitly endorse the law of the excluded middle.’
In the intuitionist case, denial must be taken in the following ‘subtle’ sense,
which
is not as strong as the intuitionist’s assertion of a negation, but not
as weak as the intuitionist’s mere failure to assert. The requirement
is that to deny, in our sense, is to refuse to accept. A statement
is rejected if any move to accept it would be a change of mind,
and not merely a supplementation with new information. (Restall,
2005, 9, fnote 5)
Even if, at least prima facie, this successfully allays the intuitionist’s misgiv-
ings, assessing the precise strength of a refusal to accept and, in particular,
the precise strength of a prohibition to refuse to accept is still a difficult mat-
ter. The latter – our sui generis undeniability operator – must come very
close to a license to assert, at least if the logical consequence relation is to
retain the strength usually attached to it. Customarily, sequents are under-
stood as entailments, i.e., claims to the effect that the succedent follows from
the antecedent. Yet the statements in the succedent of a bilaterally inter-
preted sequent are merely placed under an interdiction to refuse to accept
them. One cannot take it for granted that one can recover consequence with
its usual strength, amounting to a license to assert, from incoherent states
– see Rumfitt (2008); Steinberger (2010) for criticism of bilateralism in this
spirit.
That this is, nonetheless possible, is suggested by an analysis of Cut in-
spired by a remark of Girard (1989, 30) proposing that Cut may be used,
alongside Id, to assess the strength of formulae in a calculus. Cut states
that the right-hand side occurrence of the Cut-formula is stronger than its
left-hand side occurrence. Id states that the left-hand side occurrence of the
2In the case of the intuitionistic sequent calculus LJ, the right-hand side of the sequents can be at most
a singleton, so Y is empty. Cut for sequents – If X : Y,A is incoherent and A,X : Y is incoherent,
then X : Y is incoherent – follows from Extensibility by contraposition. Closure under extensibility
has been criticised independently of intuitionism, cf. Ripley (2015).
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Id-formula is stronger than its right-hand side occurrence. Together they
cancel each other out and establish the equal strength of the right and the
left side of a sequent.
What if we could use Cut to assess the relative strength of intuitionist
assertion and denial? In its applications, the Cut formula appears twice,
once in a context where its denial is ruled out and once in a context where
it is asserted. This suggests that having a license to accept a statement and
not being allowed to refuse to accept it are, in a sense, of equal strength.
Can we turn this ‘suggestion’ into a rigorous argument? And can we do it
without generating intuitionistic misgivings?
I believe that both these desiderata are within reach. The thought is that
the admissibility of Cut is eo ipso evidence that even intuitionistically the
commitment to assert a sentence in a given context is no stronger than the
commitment not to deny (in Restall’s sense) that sentence. So let us have a
closer look at Cut in the context of a sequent calculus for intuitionist logic
(LJ).
3 The ingredients
Standardly, a sequent calculus is taken to determine a consequence relation
on formulae via an interpretation of sequents as consequence claims. That
is, the consequence relation usually associated to a sequent calculus S is its
so-called internal consequence relation (Avron, 1991):
Definition 1 (Internal consequence) A is an internal consequence of X
in S iff the sequent X : A is derivable in S.
Gentzen (1935) proved that LJ and LJ−, i.e., LJ without Cut, have the
same derivable sequents. Anything that can be derived with Cut can be
derived without it or, equivalently, its addition to LJ− does not modify the
stock of derivable sequents. This means that Cut is an admissible rule in
LJ−.
However, incoherent states themselves can be the objects of inferring and
the bilateral interpretation provides a good account of inferring as a process
of ampliating incoherent states. In turn, this inferential process generates
a reflexive, monotonic, and transitive derivability relation between sequents.
In other words, it generates a Blok-Jónsson consequence relation on sequents
(Blok and Jónsson, 2006):
Definition 2 (Blok-Jónsson consequence) Let U be a set, P(U) its pow-
erset and a ∈ U . A Blok-Jónsson consequence relation on U is a relation
`⊂ P(U)× U that is reflexive, monotonic, and transitive.
Unlike the more familiar Tarskian consequence relations (q.v. Tarski, 1956,
ch. 3), Blok-Jónsson consequence relations are carried by arbitrary sets, not
4
just sets of formulae or statements. In particular, they can arise between
incoherent states or sequents.
The consequence relations between incoherent states determined by LJ and
LJ−, `SLJ and `SLJ− respectively, are clearly distinct. For instance, whereas
{p : r, r : s} `SLJ p : s, {p : r, r : s} 6`SLJ− p : s. In general, LJ
− lacks many
sequent-to-sequent inferences (or metainferences) that are available in LJ.
Thus, the metainference rule
A&B,X : C
&LιmA,B,X : C
is derivable in LJ. That is, there is an LJ-derivation of its conclusion sequent








A,B : A&B A&B,X : C
Cut
A,B,X : C
Since LJ− lacks Cut, this derivation fails; nor is there any other way to derive
&Lιm, as an inverted proof search will show. (But this rule is, nonetheless,
admissible in LJ−.)3
The fundamental insight of the Blok-Jónsson paradigm is that the objects
related by a consequence relation are less important than the reasoning that
generates it. One’s account of consequence should be neutral with respect
to the ‘ontologies’ upon which it is based. The upshot of their definition of
consequence is a theory of equivalence of consequence relations exhibiting
this kind of neutrality:
Definition 3 (Equivalence of consequence relations) Let U1 and U2 be
two sets and `1⊆ P(U1) × U1 with, respectively, `2⊆ P(U2) × U2 their as-
sociated BJ consequence relations. `1 and `2 are equivalent iff there exist
mappings τ : U1 → P(U2) and ρ : U2 → P(U1) such that:
1. X `1 a iff τ(X) `2 τ(a)
2. b a`2 τ(ρ(b))
for every X ∪ {a} ⊆ U1 and every b ∈ U2.4
This allows one to define, for any sequent calculus, an equivalence class of
consequence relations induced by the Blok-Jónsson consequence on sequents
3This is a familiar situation in the case of classical logic. Gentzen’s cut-less classical sequent calculus
(LK−) can be used to formalise the logic ST advocated in Cobreros et al. (2013) as a means of
retaining classical reasoning in the presence of the paradoxes. The ST theorists claim that it is
simply classical logic. There are serious doubts that this claim is cogent (Barrio et al., 2015), and
the Blok-Jónsson framework provides a way to argue against ST’s pretensions of classicality (Dicher
and Paoli, 201x). The intuitionist case has received less attention; see though Thomas (2014).
4In Blok and Jónsson (2006), this is called ‘similarity’.
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associated to it. Take, for instance, the consequence relation on formulae in-
duced internally by LJ, `ILJ, and the sequent-to-sequent consequence relation
`SLJ of LJ. We can define τ and ρ as, respectively,
τ(A) =df ∅ : A ρ(X : A) =df (A1 & . . .&An)→ A
for all Ai ∈ X, i = 1, . . . , n. Under these mappings, `SLJ and `ILJ fall in the
same equivalence class. So does the following external consequence relation,
`ELJ, defined not over sequents in general, but over sequents with empty
antecedents (Avron, 1991):
Definition 4 (External consequence) A is an external consequence of X
in LJ iff the sequent ∅ : A is derivable in LJ ∪ {∅ : Bi|∀Bi ∈ X}.
The internal and external consequence relations of LJ coincide in the presence
of Cut; without it, i.e., in LJ−, they are extensionally distinct. Take, for
instance, modus ponens. Obviously, A,A→ B `ILJ− B. This is just a matter
of applying →L:
X : A B,X : C
→L
A→ B,X : C
to the axioms A : A and B : B. Nevertheless, neither `ELJ− nor, a fortiori,
`SLJ− sanction this entailment. Its image under τ is {∅ : A, ∅ : A→ B} ` ∅ :
B, which LJ− cannot deliver in the absence of Cut on formulas.
4 The arguments
Now we can attempt to formulate two arguments showing that Restall’s ‘pro-
hibition to refuse to deny’ indeed has all the properties required of intuitionist
denial.
The first argument runs as follows. We start with the fact that LJ− yields
intuitionist logic as its internal consequence relation; this is true even if LJ−
is interpreted bilaterally. The intuitionist is worried that this interpretation
assigns to conclusions a ‘lesser’ status than that which they deserve. This,
however, boils down to Cut not being correct on the bilateral interpretation.
Thus, the intuitionist has no viable, independent and non-prejudicial, way of
objecting to the rules of LJ−, even if bilaterally interpreted. Thus
P1 The bilaterally interpreted LJ− is a calculus for intuitionist logic.
Grant, for the sake of the argument, that
P2 Cut, bilaterally interpreted, is intuitionistically incorrect.
At the very least, this means that Cut is not admissible in LJ−. But in this
case, the external consequence relation of LJ− will not be intuitionist logic.
Suppose that we also grant the extra premiss:




I shall not argue for the supplementary premiss, except by default: these
relations do normally coincide. It follows that
C The bilaterally interpreted LJ− – i.e., LJ− without admissible Cut – is
not a calculus for intuitionist logic.
But C contradicts P1. So either P1 or P2 must go. Since there is no case
against P1 that could be made independently of P2, one must reject the
latter: It is not the case that Cut is not correct on the bilateral interpretation.
Hence, it is correct.
This argument is not without problems. The most glaring, presumably,
is the paucity of evidence offered for P3. But in truth, this is the least
problem of the argument. Though not canvassed here, such evidence could
be provided, e.g., along the lines of Barrio et al. (2018). This aside, one may,





Read bottom-to-top and as a condition on coherent states, it seems to licence
the passage from ‘it is coherent to accept X and refuse to accept ¬A’ to ‘it
is coherent to accept X,A and refuse to deny some contradiction’. (Recall
that the empty succedent is the syntactical mark of the falsity constant,
⊥.) This seems to be an inferential passage from two iterations of ‘negative’
attitudes to a ‘positive’ one, which may be problematic to the extent that it
is reminiscent of double-negation elimination.5
Moreover, the intuitionist, even having granted P1-P3 and C, may still
be suspicious about the final conclusion of the argument. After all, we obtain
it by shaving off double-negations and moving from ‘it is not the case that
(. . . ) is not correct’ to ‘(. . . ) is correct’. Can we be sure that this instance
of double negation elimination is correct?
Attempting to fix this argument is beyond the scope of this paper. I take it,
however, that the complications affecting it are illustrative of the difficulties
inherent in dealing with nonstandard senses of denial. Fortunately, since I
believe that there is a safer and more direct route to the same conclusion, its
failure, albeit instructive, is not of great significance.
A rather more straightforward argument would proceed from the fact that
`SLJ, `ELJ, and `ILJ fall in the same equivalence class. So take `SLJ (`ELJ tags
along as a particular case) under the bilateral reading of LJ. This is safe:
even the intuitionist ought to accept that one can reason intuitionistically
about incoherent states. Take also `ILJ under the standard construal of LJ.
These are two consequence relations over distinct entities which, nonetheless,
fall in the same equivalence class via the transformers from Definition 3.
But those transformers map undeniable statements to warrantedly assertible
statements. This, I submit, is compelling evidence that, as regimented by the
5I owe this example, though given with a different intent, to an anonymous referee.
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sequent calculus, the prohibition to refuse to accept a statement carries the
same strength as the licence to assert that statement, again, as regimented
by the sequent calculus. This argument does not ascribe any kind of priority,
conceptual or otherwise, to `SLJ over `ILJ, or the other way round. It simply
takes each of these relations, with the interpretation attached to them and
to the statements that occur in them, and measures their relative strength.
Thus it is perfectly egalitarian.
Just like the preceding argument, this too has its weak points. One may
reply that the argument merely shows that LJ is a calculus for intuitionist
logic: after all, nothing specific to bilateralism plays any part in it. This
is a cogent point as far as it concerns the fact that the transformers would
have yielded the same result irrespective of the interpretation attached to the
calculi in question. Yet the objection disregards the injunction to consider
those consequence relations under a particular interpretation. This ought to
be taken seriously in the heuristic of the argument. To do otherwise is to
reject a priori the possibility of a top-down argument in favour of bilateralism.
So the argument, while defeasible, is not defeated yet.
Furthermore, by dispensing with the egalitarianism professed above, we
can use the Blok-Jónsson paradigm to present the argument in a somewhat
more enticing light:
In effect, the bilateral interpretation re-conceptualises inferring as a pas-
sage between incoherent states. In a more familiar and more general jargon,
it moves from inferences to metainferences. In doing so, it indicates, per-
haps inadvertently perhaps, the vertical dimension of a sequent calculus as
the dominant and indeed natural vector for the generation of logical conse-
quence. The plight of the bilateralist springs from the fact that, while she
offers a novel account of inferring, she nonetheless fails to offer an appropri-
ately updated account of how inference and consequence connect. Instead,
she insists on recovering consequence directly from sequents, by, as it were,
simply swapping the sequent sign with the consequence sign.
The Blok-Jónsson account of consequence allows us to match on the con-
sequence side what the bilateralist did on the inference side. We can take
the sequent-to-sequent derivability relation of LJ as a bona fide consequence
relation (Dicher and Paoli, 2018). Moreover, we can also see it as the main
relation that is determined by that calculus: after all, sequent calculi deal
with sequents, not formulae. All in all, it is possible to do justice to the bilat-
eralist having made the vertical dimension of a sequent calculus the fulcrum
for the determination of a consequence relation.
Then the fact that, in the absence of Cut, LJ− fails to determine the
intuitionist logical consequence (over sequents) receives an entirely new sig-
nificance. The bilateralist and the more traditional intuitionist can agree
that one can reason intuitionistically about both incoherent states and war-
rantedly assertible statements as regimented in standard natural deduction
systems or Hilbert-style calculi, etc. To put it another way, they can agree
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that one can track, via intuitionistic reasoning, both the propagation of the
warrant to assert and the correct extension of incoherent states. From the
Blok-Jónsson perspective, via their concept of equivalence of consequence
relations, we can see that a warrantedly assertible statement in one case is
a statement that one cannot refuse to accept in the other. If this is so, then
how can one persist in doubting that there is a sense of denial of the required
kind?
5 Epilogue
If these remarks are correct, then we have a viable, albeit highly abstract,
argument that Restall’s posited sense of intuitionist denial can indeed deliver
the goods. There is another way to look at this. It seems to me that the
Blok-Jónsson paradigm deflates the whole issue, as far as consequence is
concerned. There is no need to worry about what sequents are or about
how many formulae they have in the succedent etc. Logical consequence is
a relation that can occur between many things. Among other things, it can
occur between sequent, which, whatever they are, need not be entailments.
This is the consequence relation properly and primarily determined by a
sequent calculus. Derivatively, such calculi can also determine consequence
relations among other kinds of things. They do this in the sense of Definition
3. How we construe sequents is an important matter, but not one that should
affect our understanding of consequence.6
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